English

Letter from Congolese intellectuals and friends to the UN Secretary-General

We, the undersigned—writers, artists, journalists, religious leaders, lawyers, doctors, civil society members, researchers, and university professors from the Democratic Republic of Congo and worldwide—feel compelled by virtue of Intellectual honesty to provide essential clarifications regarding the letter addressed to you by Rwandan intellectuals and their foreign associates concerning the tragic events in eastern Congo (ref. genocidealertdrc.org). These clarifications are crucial for finding a lasting solution to the crisis in eastern Congo.

It is evident that most signatories of the aforementioned letter responded in good faith to persistent solicitations from its authors, whose sole objective was to defend “their cause,” even at the expense of historical principles and truths. One would have expected the signatories to first deplore the current circumstances: civilian massacres in Goma, multiple summary executions in Bukavu, destruction of refugee camps, rape of women and girls, imposition of degrading corporal punishment, and exclusion of humanitarian workers from occupied zones. Yet, these crimes remain unaddressed.

We are primarily concerned about the authors’ apparent disregard for a fundamental principle of international law: respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. This principle underpins the international community’s ongoing condemnation of Rwanda’s violations and its presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo over the past 30 years. The authors justify this violation by suggesting that the conflict in eastern Congo should not be viewed through the lens of the “singular narrative of Congo’s balkanization risk and exploitation of its natural resources” but rather as the result of explosive social and economic tensions primarily the exclusion of Congolese Tutsis. Thus, they argue that more than territorial expansion and mineral resource exploitation, the fate of Congolese Tutsis and the presence of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) would justify Rwanda’s violation of the principle of border inviolability.

The signatories failed to explain how these acts of war and criminal behavior improved the situation of Tutsis in Congo. Notably, Alexis Gisaro, a Congolese Tutsi intellectual and Minister of Public Works in Kinshasa, clearly stated on behalf of his community: “We have not mandated any foreign state to take care of us!”

Rwanda’s repeated attacks on Congolese territory—five in total since 1996—have complicated the situation for Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese. This is evident when comparing their circumstances in recent decades to those from colonial times through the 1990s.

It is equally striking that the letter’s authors reduce the essence, existence, and governance of the Democratic Republic of Congo—a country covering 2,345,410 km² with nearly 450 diverse ethnic groups and a population exceeding 100 million, equipped with democratic institutions—to a confrontation between the State and its citizens on one side, and the Tutsi minority, which represents less than one percent of the total population, on the other.

Another concerning approach by the authors is their suggestion that the ideology and practice of Tutsi genocide are inevitable and must be universally applicable. This implies that Congo maintains a permanent, official moral stance that permits such acts. Consequently, the United Nations is exhorted “not to repeat the same tragic errors of judgment as during the genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994.”

Mr. Secretary-General,

Referring to an apparently thorough study of the region’s history, the letter presents M23’s emergence as the “systematic deprivation of human rights of Banyarwanda and Tutsi in the DRC.” Beyond the fact that precise and irrefutable references should support such supposedly scientific assertions, we must highlight the malicious simultaneous use of the terms “Banyarwanda and Tutsi.” In the Democratic Republic of Congo, particularly in North Kivu, there are Kinyarwanda-speaking populations consisting of the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi. Intellectual honesty requires acknowledging that the various rebellions and punitive expeditions conducted by Rwanda over the past 30 years have primarily aimed to defend Tutsi interests, with Congolese Hutu suffering substantial casualties.

We invite you to consider these important facts that challenge what others are trying to convince you of:

1. While war rages in the East, there are Congolese Tutsi serving as members of government, parliament, public institutions, and the army, including General Masunzu. Where is this alleged hatred of Tutsi?
2. Historically, the vast majority of Rwandophones in Congo were settled by colonial authorities as part of initiatives supporting nascent Congolese industry (1927) or as a humanitarian gesture to relieve Rwanda’s population pressure by moving people to Kivu (1937-1945, 1949-1955). On the eve of Congo’s independence, the colonial electoral law of March 23, 1960, did not grant voting rights to all these immigrants and their descendants, recognizing this right only for residents of more than ten years. Yet, from the first government in 1960, independent Congo included a Rwandophone among its members—Marcel Bisukiro as Minister of Foreign Trade. Where was this supposed hatred of Rwandophones by the Congolese people then?
3. From 1959 to 1994, for four decades, Congo-Zaire received, welcomed, and socially integrated contingents of Tutsi refugees fleeing Rwandan pogroms. Many studied in Congolese schools and universities, even receiving scholarships. They subsequently held various positions in Republican institutions and public services, working as businessmen, lawyers, secondary school teachers, or university professors. Most notably, Barthélemy Bisengimana Rwema, an engineering graduate from Lovanium University in Kinshasa, served as Mobutu’s Chief of Staff from 1969 to 1977, effectively exercising responsibilities usually reserved for a Vice President. He managed the business nationalization portfolio (Zairianization), creating a Tutsi baronship in Congo, particularly in Kivu. He is also credited with Law No. 72-002 of January 5, 1972, which granted Zairian nationality to persons from Ruanda-Urundi established in Kivu Province before January 1, 1950. Where was the hatred of Tutsi then?
4. During the Mulelist rebellions in South Kivu, Tutsi refugees actively fought alongside Congolese rebels, as Ernesto Che Guevara documented in his writings. Where was the hatred of Tutsi then? The Bolivian revolutionary notably observed about these populations of Rwandan origin in the Fizi region that they maintained a strong spirit of attachment to their homeland. Could this indicate a particular difficulty in integrating with other communities?
5. The immense privileges granted to Tutsi during Bisengimana’s era ultimately ignited non-Tutsi anger. Their claims intensified as Mobutu’s power declined. While there was never any harassment of Tutsi students at the Kinshasa campus, there was, however, the exclusion at the Sovereign National Conference of Rwandophones, both Tutsi and Hutu, within the general framework of what was then termed “Zairians of doubtful nationality.” This sentiment was subsequently exacerbated as many Tutsi, considered Congolese, openly provided moral and financial support to the rebellion against the former Rwandan regime, with some, especially from Masisi and Rutshuru, joining it. Several Congolese Tutsi leaders themselves proved this complicity by massively returning to Rwanda when the RPF took power, occupying high positions there, including in the army.

Moreover, from Mobutu’s overthrow in May 1997 to Felix Tshisekedi’s rise to power in January 2019—excluding the brief period (mid-1998 to January 2001) when Rwanda fell out with Laurent Kabila, leading to his assassination—Tutsi elites effectively controlled the primary levers of power in the DRC: intelligence services, security and defense forces, and Republican institutions. Popular belief asserts that nothing significant occurred in Congo during this time without Kigali’s decision.

Given these circumstances, it is difficult to understand the discourse on excluded and marginalized Tutsi expressed by the letter’s signatories. During this same period, however, the rebellions of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), and M23 emerged and operated in Kivu, ostensibly to defend these same Tutsi populations.

Mr. Secretary-General,

Before addressing the FDLR question, which has been extensively exploited by Rwandan leaders, we wish to express our surprise at the letter’s tendentious narrative. In attempting to catalog the main forces on the ground, it places M23 on equal footing with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) and inevitably associates the FDLR with the Wazalendo, attributing genocidal ideology to both. The authors and signatories should have provided documented evidence of violence committed against Tutsi by the Wazalendo—facts that would be difficult to conceal, especially given the presence of UN troops and services in those specific areas.

It is surprising that the Rwandan government expresses greater concern for Congolese Rwandophones (Tutsi) than for Rwandan Rwandophones living in Congo, under the pretext that the latter are considered genocidaires. Under this FDLR concept, the Rwandan state has enforced the marginalization of Rwanda’s majority ethnic group, the Hutu, who have suffered decimation and massacres in Congo for three decades. In the narrative constructed by Rwandan power, today Hutu=Interahamwe=FDLR.

For reference, Ugandan-Rwandan armies systematically massacred Hutu refugees in Congolese forests during 1996-97, to such an extent that some analysts spoke of a Hutu genocide following the Tutsi genocide. Most notable was the massacre of hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees in the Tingitingi forest, extensively documented by the Mapping Report and several human rights organizations, an investigation into which the United Nations never obtained authorization from AFDL Congolese rebels and their Rwandan supporters. The Rwandan ambassador to the UN even declared on February 3, 1997: “There are no refugees inside Zaire, but 40,000 Hutu soldiers and their families.” The international community has chosen to forget these massacres that continue to haunt the memory of Congolese peasants who had never before witnessed violence of such magnitude.

The Rwandan rebellions of the RCD, CNDP, and M23 have persisted in this effort from 1998 to the present day. To tackle the ongoing allegation of complicity with the FDLR, the DRC, at the urging of the international community, permitted the Rwandan army to enter Congolese territory to pursue the Interahamwe (Hutu) from 2009 to 2012 through operations subsequently called Umoja Wetu (our unity), Kimia I and II (peace), and Amani Leo (peace today).

Subsequently, the Government of the Republic signed the Pretoria Agreement with Rwanda on July 31, 2002, in the presence of the South African Government as a third party. This agreement committed to significantly reducing the operational FDLR presence on DRC soil in exchange for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Congolese territory.

Several FDLR repatriations and their dependents were conducted from the KAMINA Military Base with assistance from the United Nations via its peacekeeping operations, MONUC and later MONUSCO. Our argument rests on dates and facts that your competent services could corroborate, as nothing was done without their involvement. Here they are:

1. April 18, 2014: The leader of the Rwandan negative force, FDLR, addressed a letter to several world personalities informing them of their commitment to proceed from May 30, 2014, and before witnesses, with the voluntary disarmament of their combatants present for several years in Congo’s North and South Kivu provinces.
2. July 2, 2014, in Luanda, Angola: Mandated by their respective heads of state concerned with preserving human lives, the foreign affairs and national defense ministers of both SADC and ICGLR member states decided to grant FDLR a maximum deadline of 6 months until January 2, 2015, to respect this commitment, failing which military action would be initiated against combatants who had not voluntarily laid down their arms by this deadline.
3. By January 2, 2015, the DRC Government and MONUSCO, SADC, ICGLR, African Union, and the Extended Joint Verification Mechanism composed of military experts from all ICGLR member states, witnesses to the voluntary disarmament process announced by FDLR, observed that FDLR combatant surrender occurred in three waves:
4. May 20, 2014: 104 combatants at KATEKU in North Kivu province surrendered, and 104 weapons, including 12 collective weapons, were deposited.
5. June 9, 2014: 83 combatants at KIGOGO in South Kivu province surrendered, and 83 weapons were deposited, including eight collective weapons.
6. December 28, 2014: 84 combatants at BULEUSA in North Kivu and 67 at BURINYI in South Kivu surrendered, with 37 and 30 weapons deposited, respectively, including 11 collective weapons overall.

In total, 338 combatants surrendered with 254 weapons deposited, representing only 26% of the total FDLR combatant force present in DRC, evaluated at 1,300 in October 2012 by the military assessment team established by the ICGLR Heads of State and Government Summit.

• December 8, 2016: DRC readily handed over Ladislas NTAGANZWA, an FDLR leader arrested in North Kivu.

5. November 30, 2018: Closure of Walungu, Kanyabayonga, and Kisangani camps and repatriation to Rwanda of all FDLR and their dependents, totaling 1,609 combatants.
6. September 2019: Sylvestre MUDACHUMURA and Ignace IRETEGEKA, FDLR leaders, were neutralized through a joint FARDC and Rwandan Army operation.
7. September 2024: While the Luanda process stalled, the DRC Government apprehended FDLR chief General Pacifique NTAWUNGUKA, alias “Omega.”

From the above, it should be noted that Rwanda has never made a single reciprocal gesture, despite the recommendation from the 8th High-Level Summit of the Regional Monitoring Mechanism of the Framework Agreement, held in Brazzaville on October 19, 2017.

Most surprisingly, some of these Rwandan Hutu FDLR elements, repatriated to Rwanda, have reappeared in Congo, massacring Congolese populations and plundering natural resources. There appear to be both real and false FDLR. It is in Congo, not Rwanda, that FDLR has carried out the most civilian massacres while continuing to serve as alibis for maintaining entire Congolese regions under Rwanda’s sphere of influence.

Mr. Secretary-General,

We submit for your fair consideration that M23, which has been condemned by several UN Security Council resolutions, the African Union, the European Union, and African Regional Economic Communities, is completely exonerated and absolved by the authors and signatories of this letter.

We respectfully remind you that, as attested by numerous UN reports, national and international NGOs, and media, war crimes and crimes against humanity continued by this armed group and its Rwandan supporters: civilian massacres, sexual violence, child soldier recruitment, displacement of thousands, etc. The thousands of deaths from the Goma invasion (over 6,000) bear witness to this, as does a viral video on social networks showing a Rwandan soldier from this expedition boasting about raping a nun.

Regarding the presence of United Nations troops, we wonder how the authors and signatories of the letter, who are nationals of UN member countries seeking the UN Secretary-General’s intervention, could perceive so narrowly that MONUSCO “has strayed from its peacekeeping mission by closely associating with these (genocidaire) armed groups.” We lament that MONUSCO has been repeatedly targeted by M23 attacks, resulting in loss of life.

Mr. Secretary-General,

Numerous observers, researchers, and analysts have affirmed, with supporting data, an obvious link between these deadly attacks and the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources. It would be pretentious, if not indecent, to question this and to suggest that all UN Expert Committee reports were mistaken. Even the latest report demonstrates that the choice of attacked regions closely follows strategic artisanal mining site locations.

There is another reason the letter’s signatories prefer to remain silent, which is clearly evident in official Rwandan discourse: the expansionist agenda of the Kigali regime and its desire to conquer parts of Congolese territory under the fallacious pretext of reconstituting the myth of a pre-colonial greater Rwanda. Rwandan leaders have expressed this ambition for 30 years. On October 10, 1996, in Cyangugu, then-President Pasteur Bizimungu declared, “If our fighters are currently in Zaire, they are at home!” In April 2023, Paul Kagame, visiting Cotonou in Benin, stated, “The borders drawn in colonial times divided our countries; a large part of Rwanda was left outside, in eastern Congo.” Without invoking the principle of the inviolability of inherited colonial borders, adopted at the 2nd OAU Summit in 1963, the existence of this greater Rwanda is not recognized by any professional historian, as the Rwandan kingdom never reached the spatial dimensions of the current Republic of Rwanda.

Regarding Congolese Tutsi refugees living in Rwanda, this represents, according to repeated discourse from Rwandan leaders, one of the main justifications (referred to as “root causes” of conflict) for rebellions and various aggressions, as the Democratic Republic of Congo is considered their native land. Yet, the letter to the Secretary-General indicates that thousands of Rwandan Tutsi refugees “are condemned to a precarious life in camps in Burundi, Uganda, and Kenya.” History tells us that Tanzania, following a presidential decision, forcibly repatriated 15,000 Rwandan refugees, primarily Tutsi, in August 2013, who were living in the Kagera border region. It is curious that the Rwandan government, committed to defending Tutsi, has neither sought to repatriate its citizens nor initiated hostilities against its other neighboring countries, which, it should be noted, also contain Tutsi populations.

Life for these Congolese refugees in Rwanda is also challenging. While the Rwandan government estimates their number in the hundreds of thousands, NGOs count 80,000, and Congolese authorities report 72,000. In February 2018, five people were killed and twenty wounded by police at Kiziba camp in western Rwanda during the crackdown that ensued after several days of protests over reductions in food rations.

In May 2023, a Tripartite Agreement was signed between the DRC Government, the Rwandan Government, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees concerning the voluntary repatriation of Congolese refugees residing in Rwanda. Rwanda has never granted the regulatory individual physical control requests made by the other two partners.

Mr. Secretary-General,

Allow us to conclude.

The lasting solution to the current crisis must consider the root causes of these conflicts. These root causes are not Congolese; they are intra-Rwandan and stem from the Tutsi-Hutu antagonism. Although aware of this reality, the international community pretends to ignore it. To avoid friction with the Kigali regime, which has skillfully instrumentalized international guilt over the Tutsi genocide, it prefers to adopt a complacent posture to please the Rwandan regime, thus avoiding accusations of negationism.

Only true Tutsi-Hutu reconciliation on Rwandan soil can be the true starting point for lasting peace, establishing the “existential” foundation for harmony in the Great Lakes region. The Kivu war is merely an extension of the ongoing Rwandan-Rwandan conflict within Congolese territory, a situation exploited at will for an expansionist agenda and mafia practices in the commercialization and financing of mineral economies, rare earth elements, and the exploitation of agriculture and forests.

The international community, along with national and regional religious institutions, should find the courage to address this complex issue to ultimately bring an end to the ongoing cycle of wars and violence. Minimizing this crisis to mere political disputes in Congo would be a serious mistake, as our recent history has shown.

We urge you, Mr. Secretary-General, to fully commit to addressing this complex issue for the sake of humanity’s honor and the credibility of the United Nations.

(Original: French)

Click here to add your signature.